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1. Introduction 
 
In developed countries the speed of technological change is rapid and the diffusion of 
new knowledge is facilitated by high educational levels and production competencies. In 
developing countries a consistent part of the population is illiterate, domestic 
development of scientific and technical knowledge is absent or proceeds very slowly.  
 
Transnational corporations organise their production across nations and, „on the surface 
… [they] would seem to be ideal vehicles for helping underdeveloped countries‟ to 
improve their relative position with respect to industrialised countries.
1
 Yet they are 
playing only a minor role as far as knowledge accumulation in developing countries is 
concerned. The volume of investments in innovative-related activities performed in 
developing countries has increased marginally.
2
 Productivity, which is an indicator of the 
effects of technological transfer and learning, has not increased indistinctively across 
countries and industrial sectors. It has been shown that transnationals stimulate domestic 
firms to become more productive only in sectors where best practices are consistent with 
their existing competencies and capabilities,
3
 „but that there are no significant transfers of 
modern technologies‟.4 Moreover as Hymer observed,5 foreign affiliates, sometimes 
operates in „enclaves‟: inside, modern technologies and products manufactured for 
foreign markets have not much in common with the backwardness of the external 
environment. Under these circumstances, spillovers of knowledge and fertilisation of 
domestic firms through learning do not take place.
6
  
 
The recognition of the link between the international division of labour and knowledge 
diffusion has been somehow disregarded by the economics of innovation and by 
development and internationalisation theories. Each of these perspectives has, in turn, 
addressed a specific aspect of the problem, namely: the nature of knowledge and the 
conditions under which technological change occurs; the importance of human capital 
formation and educational policies for promoting development; and the role of 
knowledge assets for the internationalisation of production either to exploit technological 
advantages abroad or to benefit from localised knowledge in host countries. In this paper, 
these angles are three pieces of the same picture, which are combined together in order to 
provide a perspective on how the knowledge incorporated in production impacts on the 
accumulation of localised knowledge.  
 
As mentioned, theory affords knowledge an extremely positive role in the activation of 
endogenous development process.
7
 We acknowledge this point and we go further. The 
 2 
issue of knowledge formation is not just a matter of how much knowledge is 
accumulated. It entails also a concern about the quality of knowledge and about who 
controls the direction that knowledge formation takes across localities. The three 
theoretical perspectives on knowledge formation and technological change, local 
development and the internationalisation of production operated by transnational 
corporations have not yet been combined to provide an answer to this question. 
 
One of the most significant stimuli to identify differences across localities in terms of 
their function within the international division of labour comes from Hymer‟s work. At 
the heart of his radical perspective is the awareness that the production system dominated 
by transnationals is defined as a hierarchy of activities and powers associated to those 
activities.
8
 The hierarchical structure of the corporation is mirrored by the “macrocosm” 
provided by the international economy so that the application of location theory to the 
corporate hierarchy of functions suggests concentration of control within the economy. 
 
Building on this perspective, we suggest that the fundamental issue that links 
internationalisation of production by large corporations and the formation of knowledge 
capital across different localities is the uneven distribution of decision-making power 
with respect to technologies, educational programmes and innovation related activities. 
This idea is rooted in the strategic decision making approach which, as Cowling and 
Sugden
9
 maintain, goes to the heart of how production is carried out. The firm, as an 
island of conscious planning,
10
 allows for the coordination of production from one centre 
of strategic decision making. Consistently, a transnational corporation is a means to 
control and coordinate production from one centre of strategic decision-making across 
national borders.
11
 This suggests the possibility of strategic failure across economic 
systems, which occurs when the process of strategic decision making in an economy 
prevents from the achievement of a socially desirable outcome.
12
  
 
In particular, the international coordination of manufacturing functions may imply at 
various degrees the „fragmentation‟ of production knowledge. The concept of 
„specialisation‟ has a positive meaning and refers to the acquisition and consolidation of 
technical, organisational and social skills together with the ability to understand, if not 
undertaking, the production process as a whole. In this sense, as Young argues, 
specialisation is beneficial both for the locality as a collective entity and for individual 
actors. With „fragmentation‟, by contrast, we mean the creation of very narrow functions 
which require little or no specific technical, organisational, or social knowledge. Each 
mini-function can be monitored but it will hardly let the general competences and skills 
of the executors emerge. The link with the overall production process is hardly 
perceptible.
13
 Within the international division of labour operated by transnationals we 
recognise the risk of excessive fragmentation, especially in those host countries where 
transnationals‟ activities support the emergence of subcontractors of the sweat-shop kind. 
In Transition Countries, the nature of manufacturing activities mainly related to 
traditional sectors is an example of how foreign capital can be a source of fragmentation 
that disqualifies labour. 
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Constraints over individuals‟ capabilities may not combine with local development 
objectives, thus leading to strategic failure. With respect to knowledge creation, the 
implications of strategic failure have been left unexplored. Knowledge formation is a time 
and capital consuming activity. Developing countries, in particular, have been recognised 
to have many competing needs while suffering from lack of capital.
14
 The creation of a 
knowledge base is a need which struggles with other priorities. For this reason policy 
makers may leave the field open to foreign investors. Where in developing countries the 
rate of technological change and accumulation of production knowledge is mainly 
determined by FDI inflows, policy makers face two issues of strategic importance which 
both have relevant implications for the direction that development may take within 
regions. The first is the danger of a domination of production, technological and 
educational decisions by large corporations. The second relates to the need not just to 
promote the rate at which technological change takes place, but also to be aware of and 
promote the direction of such a change.
15
 This could be done, for instance, by 
encouraging investments in knowledge creation (R&D and higher education) that are not 
only linked to corporate interests but that are meant to increase the choice options of 
people and to pull regions out of subordination.  
 
Building on these considerations, we would like to deal with some of the limitations and 
effects of transnational corporations as means to facilitate learning and the diffusion of 
knowledge in developing countries. We then link the results of this analysis to 
phenomena of geographical polarisation of knowledge creation activities. Our aim is to 
provide a framework for understanding the direction of industrial development in the 
light of the international division of labour operated by transnationals. In particular, we 
focus on those aspects of production that are related to knowledge, its nature and 
evolution over time. Our contribution emphasises how production decisions influence the 
evolution of knowledge assets within firms and territories, and determine (sometimes 
irreversibly) the evolutionary trajectory of localities. Given the cumulative nature of 
learning and the close links that relate actors‟ opportunities with their past experiences, 
we argue that the technological direction defined by transnationals might not have much 
to offer to developing countries or, worst, might activate a vicious circle that hamper the 
capability of developing countries to discover and develop innovations of their own. 
 
After having briefly introduced - in Section 2 - the knowledge concepts that we will use 
in this work, in Section 3 we sketch some classical economists‟  perspectives on those 
aspects of production that are mainly related to knowledge. In Section 4 we provide a 
sectorial characterisation of knowledge creation and innovative related activities. In 
Section 5 we relate FDI to the development of knowledge capital within foreign 
locations, paying particular attention to developing countries. Then, we apply the 
theoretical considerations of the previous sections to the development of local production 
systems, looking at those mechanisms that may favour or hamper processes of knowledge 
accumulation within localities. Section 6 specifically addresses the problem of strategic 
failure and polarisation effects in knowledge accumulation and innovation related 
activities. Section 7 applies Hymer‟s law of uneven development to the international 
localisation of activities, and provides an explanation of how the organisation of 
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production discriminates amongst economic systems with respect to knowledge 
formation. We end this paper by re-considering industrial development in the light of the 
impact of the international division of labour as it is planned by transnational 
corporations. Policy suggestions follow. 
 
 
2. Knowledge concepts 
 
The concept of knowledge has been used in different ways. One major difference can be 
found in its use as applied to individuals, organisations, and institutions. The conceptual 
effort of going through different analytical objects is determined by the complexity of this 
concept, which cannot be identified exclusively with the individual sphere or the 
collective sphere represented by institutions.  
 
Although we can say that individual knowledge is subjective because it is linked to the 
cognitive sphere of individuals, the process of learning, both at the individual, 
organisational, and local level, is collective and involves social interaction. Learning is a 
process that refers to the acquisition of scientific and codified knowledge (the knowledge 
codified in a book), to the interpretation of external stimuli (the knowledge that 
individuals derive from observation of the external world and the ability to adapt to such 
stimuli), and to the imitation of other people‟s actions (the apprentice who follows the 
master‟s deeds). The interaction with the environment, as well as communication 
amongst individuals, is therefore a fundamental aspect of knowledge and learning 
dynamics. 
 
In particular, following Hayek‟s theoretical contribution to the theory of knowledge, we 
will refer to individual knowledge as the subjective interpretation and use of the pieces of 
information that come from the environment. It can be knowledge about social norms, 
natural phenomena, specific activities, etc. As the cognitive sphere of each individual is 
different, each individual retains unique pieces of knowledge.  
 
When referring to technological knowledge we mean the individual and organisational 
knowledge that is required to undertake specific production activities. It also includes the 
knowledge incorporated in production machineries and technologies.  
 
Knowledge inside firms and organisations in general requires a conceptual leap. It 
subsumes the knowledge of individuals that is relevant to a firm‟s activities, but also the 
knowledge institutionalised in the norms and routines that have cumulated over time. 
Knowledge is reflected in the amount of competencies internal to the firm. However, it is 
not only productive knowledge that requires an appropriate organisation. Firms need both 
internal and external organisation to provide a framework to develop and apply their 
capabilities.
16
 In this sense, setting linkages with other actors may make available more 
opportunities for firms to access and make use of the knowledge they have acquired.  
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If we enlarge the perspective to production systems, we talk about localised knowledge, 
which consists of the capability to learn and internalise the knowledge diffused in a 
particular space of production (a geographical space or a virtual community of actors), 
and to recombine it with the individual knowledge of each actor.
17
 Marshall‟s industrial 
atmosphere,
18
 for example, was the tacit and unexpressed knowledge that the inhabitants 
of the industrial district, from children to adults, could absorb just because of coming into 
everyday contact with the mesh of activities and social relations occurring within the 
geographical space of the district.  
 
These notions, which have been combined and developed within the competence view of 
the firm, emphasise the heterogeneity of firms, in terms of what they know and what they 
can do. In particular, firms generate these differences endogenously, through a continuous 
process of knowledge accumulation and creation of routines.
19
 Capabilities, which are 
associated with knowledge, represent the „option set‟ of a firm and deciding which 
competences to construct is a strategic decision.
20
 These assumptions provide the insights 
to explain production, specialisation and the division of labour amongst firms and 
regions.
21 
 
 
3. Knowledge in production: some classical views 
 
During the production process, inputs are combined by virtue of five complementary 
forms of knowledge. One is the knowledge of individuals, which is reflected in their 
„skills, dexterity, and judgment‟.  The second is the knowledge incorporated inside capital 
goods or, in other words, the technology and the tools used to undertake production 
activities. The third form of knowledge is organisational, rooted in the routines and 
practices of the firm.  
 
Production, however, does not occur in a vacuum, and increasing specialisation requires 
network relations and co-ordination amongst firms. Recent developments in the 
international organisation of production are characterised by the growing intensity of 
networks of suppliers and prime contractors which, by virtue of their linkages, extend 
their knowledge and production potential.
22
 Investments in specific technologies require 
that firms are committed to a constant interaction with other firms specialised in 
complementary activities.
23
 A fourth form of knowledge is therefore relational, and it 
directly reflects the capacity of firms to use the knowledge of others by means of co-
ordination. The fifth type of knowledge is localised knowledge, or the knowledge 
diffused within a specific space.  
 
According to Smith, the source of value in production is labour. In particular, the value of 
a good exchanged in the market is measured by the amount, the degree of hardness and 
the skills required for its production.
24
 The knowledge that a worker must cumulate in 
order to produce implies his or her involvement in a process of learning. A focus on 
labour, therefore, stresses the importance of human capital and continuous learning not 
only for those activities that are directly linked to research and development, but also 
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(Smith would probably say „especially‟) for those workers who are directly involved in 
productive activities. Besides physical capital, investments would also be directed to 
renew and increase labour‟s knowledge.  
 
When workers undertake production functions they make use of tools and machineries. 
These means of production embody the knowledge of those who designed them. In this 
sense, we understand capital goods as a combination of knowledge and matter.
25
 The boy 
described by Smith who „was constantly employed to open and shut alternately the 
communication between the boiler and the cylinder … observed that by tying a string 
from the handle to the valve which opened this communication to another part of the 
machine, the valve would open and shut without his assistance, and leave him at liberty to 
divert himself with his playfellows‟.26 The innovation introduced by the young boy was 
then installed as a standard technology in subsequent engines, and production activities 
could benefit from the knowledge that that young worker was able to imprint in the 
earlier machine. 
 
If Smith emphasised the role of knowledge in production in terms of the division of 
labour and of individual skills, subsequent contributions focused more directly on the role 
of machines. So the question of why a firm should have introduced new machineries 
found an answer with Ricardo in the possibility for the capitalist to gain extra profits.
27
 
Machines substitute labour if the cost of the innovation is lower than the cost of the 
labour force substituted by the new technology. The overall employment per each unit of 
output would diminish whenever the production of machines requires less labour than 
that which is surrogated by the machine itself. Ricardo‟s argument was reconsidered by 
Marx,
28 
and nourished the still going-on debate about the implications of technological 
change for employment.
29
  
 
Marx, however, went further. The technique (tools) applied to machines substitutes 
individuals, whose sphere of action shifts from that of physical production to the 
organisation, co-ordination and control of machineries. On the one side this impoverishes 
the knowledge and abilities of individuals who are confined by an extreme fragmentation 
of work.
30
 On the other side the introduction of machines, over time, qualifies labour by 
substituting operational functions with more qualified tasks.
31
 Machines can produce 
physical goods without the mediation of individuals. Individual‟s production activities 
become those related to the design, organisation and control of machines: it shifts from 
physical production to the production of knowledge.
32
 However, shifts from ordinary 
labour to forms of more qualified work do not occur homogeneously in the economy. 
Compensation mechanisms may not be thought of as instantaneous and automatic.
33
 
Furthermore, there are a number of tasks that are undertaken with the direct involvement 
of the labour force in manufacturing activities whose location impacts on countries‟ trade 
balances.
34
 
 
Considering the arguments presented above, classic economists rightly anticipated that 
the organisation of production impacts on the qualification of labour: too fragmented 
tasks disqualify labour. The value of production is generated by the skills and competence 
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of labour which come about through specialisation (as opposed to fragmentation). In 
parallel, technological progress is associated with specialisation and with the quality of 
human capital. Vice versa, technologies, which incorporate knowledge, represent a source 
of learning. These considerations suggest that the technological characteristics of 
industrial sectors imply different modalities of organisation of production and different 
learning possibilities at the individual level, at the level of firms and within localities. 
 
 
4. The sectorial characterisations of knowledge creation and innovation 
 
The intensity of the knowledge involved in different production activities varies 
according to scientific and technical complexity as well as to the tacit or explicit nature of 
knowledge. In these respects, we discriminate amongst activities both within the same 
sector as well as amongst different sectors. Accordingly, differences in the international 
division of labour can be further appreciated by distinguishing production according to 
the knowledge intensity of labour, technologies and products.  
 
Knowledge and innovation are not developed across the whole economy indistinctively. 
As Kondrat‟ev,35 and lately Schumpeter36 emphasised, technological progress occurs 
following cyclical waves, during which new technological trajectories emerge. At the 
same time, there may be sectors going through an expansive phase and, oppositely, 
sectors undergoing decline. The hypothesis that sectors differ in the rate and modalities of 
innovation has been interpreted by Pavitt, who distinguishes industries where firms rely 
on the technology produced by other sectors from those where firms support production 
with internal R&D. According to this main criterion, sectors are classified as „supplier-
dominated‟, „scale-intensive‟, „specialised suppliers‟ and „science-based‟. 37   
 
In particular, supplier-dominated sectors are essentially traditional labour intensive 
sectors (e.g. textiles and clothing, leather and footwear, wood and furniture) where 
innovations are largely related to processes. Technological opportunities are those 
determined by the new technologies and intermediate inputs produced by other sectors. 
The process of innovation is therefore characterised by the diffusion of best practices and 
innovative intermediate inputs. Knowledge is important to the extent that it allows 
producers to efficiently introduce the technologies produced elsewhere.  
 
Scale-intensive sectors involve complex manufacturing systems for which both product 
and process innovations are important. Economies of scale can be obtained both for 
production and R&D activities. Firms are generally large and are likely to vertically 
integrate the design/manufacturing of their production technologies. Scale intensive 
sectors include transport, the production of electrical durable goods, chemicals, glass and 
other building material.  
 
Specialised suppliers produce capital goods and focus mainly on product innovation. 
Firms are generally small and act in strict connection with their clients. These goods are 
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capital inputs for other sectors and incorporate very high technical skills of designers. The 
knowledge included in products is partly tacit and cumulates over time. 
 
Science-based products complete the taxonomy. These include firms whose production is 
strictly linked with scientific knowledge (e.g. pharmaceuticals, aerospace, electronics and 
computer industries). Innovation occurs with the emergence of new technological 
paradigms. Appropriability of knowledge through patents is high and the innovator often 
benefits from a temporal advantage which allows him/her to exploit market leadership. 
Innovation related activities are formally developed inside R&D centres. These goods are 
often incorporated as intermediate products by other sectors. Firms are often of large size, 
although small Schumpeterian innovative firms may constitute an exception.
38
  
 
This interpretation of manufacturing sectors introduces Dosi‟s hypothesis of 
technological paradigms and trajectories. According to his contribution, one of the most 
relevant for the economics of innovation, the variety of forms of production organisation 
can be explained in terms of differences of evolutionary processes amongst sectors. 
Advances in scientific knowledge open up new technological opportunities, which may 
be translated into innovations. New opportunities, in particular, are defined within 
technological paradigms.
39
 It follows that change is the outcome of a cumulative process 
of knowledge creation, learning and adaptation which cannot be simply traced back to a 
reaction to changes in market conditions. A change in relative factor prices such as an 
increase in the cost of labour, or of any raw material, may not be a sufficient element for 
introducing labour/raw materials saving technologies. The same can be said for demand 
fluctuations. This perspective suggests that the context in which technological change 
occurs does not have to be linked only to the market, but must be understood also in 
terms of the opportunities offered by existing knowledge. 
 
Whilst some knowledge may be generally available, for instance through the market for 
technologies, tacit and subjective forms of knowledge, which are built in firms‟ routines 
and experience, may largely differ across economic actors. Past experience is important 
to the extent that new opportunities emerge depending on the contextual knowledge that 
was cumulated earlier within the firm (scientific, technical and organisational knowledge 
in its tacit and explicit forms) and on the more general advancements of science and 
technology, eventually stimulated by changes in relative factor prices. On the one hand 
there is a private sphere of knowledge evolution which involves individuals and their 
subjective sphere as well as organisations. On the other side, individuals and firms‟ 
learning effects and is in turn influenced by the evolution of technological paradigms and 
general science. These knowledge elements are shared by actors operating within a 
particular technical or local community. Similarly, the larger set of institutions that 
supports the established technology and industry is oriented towards sectorial 
specialisation and can be considered as a further element that inhibits the shift from old to 
new practices and knowledge. As Veblen
40
 stressed with his 1915 essay, the institutions 
suitable for a specific set of technologies could be inappropriate for the new. Perez and 
Freeman,
41
 for instance, suggest that, after 1970, the rise of information technologies 
urged a change towards an institutional setting with respect to those needed before.
42 
The 
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basic point that we retain from these contributions is that industrial sectors and firms are 
heterogeneous with respect to knowledge assets and that new knowledge, in the form of 
technologies, routines, human capital, and institutions is path dependent: radical shifts 
require radical changes in the set of specific assets of firms and institutions. These imply 
costly reform processes and time. 
 
 
5. Transnationals and technology transfer 
 
The impact of production activities on local knowledge is not neutral. The taxonomy 
theorised by Pavitt, which finds several confirmations in applied analysis, links each 
sectorial group to specific innovation capacity and size characteristics. In the international 
economic system, the production of knowledge is increasingly linked to large capital 
investments that leave space for economies of scale to be realised, especially in R&D. 
Scale-intensive and science-based sectors are two examples of this. More generally, the 
size of firms is often significantly correlated with learning and R&D.
43
  
 
Transnational corporations (TNCs) are firms of undoubtedly large size which have 
strongly impacted on the internationalisation of production. Slaughter notices that from 
1979 to 1999 „the ratio of world FDI stock to world gross domestic product rose from 5 
to 16 per cent, and the ratio of world FDI inflows to global gross domestic capital 
formation raised from 2 to 14 per cent. One consequence of this is that an increasing 
share of developing countries‟ output is accounted for by foreign affiliates of 
multinational enterprises‟.44  
 
However, the impact of transnationals on world production is expected to be even higher. 
With the diffusion of networked organisations, transnationals control production far 
beyond the legal boundaries defined by property rights, as planning is extended to aligned 
suppliers and to the cascade of firms that are linked to first tier suppliers.
45
 Sacchetti and 
Sugden consider „the boundaries of the firm as the pattern of structural influences that the 
firm has on other actors‟ strategic decisions‟.46 A TNC‟s technological strategy, therefore, 
touches upon a space that is defined by the TNC‟s power to direct a number of other 
networked firms.  
 
How do transnationals allocate their knowledge creating capacity across regions and 
countries? Outside home countries, as Vernon anticipated, the nature of technological 
activities carried out by transnationals seems to be concerned with the adaptation of 
products and production processes to local market conditions.
47
 In particular, process 
innovation could be determined by differences in the labour market, according to the 
perspective offered by the Ricardian hypothesis.  
 
More recently, as other contributors have observed,
48
 the size of R&D investments and 
the complexity of the knowledge incorporated by technologies has pushed transnationals 
to look for other factors such as seeking strategic assets created abroad (e.g. host 
country‟s technological developments). In this case, through FDI the firm exploits the 
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knowledge of the host country. For „asset-augmenting activities‟ to take place, local 
knowledge assets must be consistent with the transnational‟s aim of reinforcing its 
technological advantage. Therefore, as Narula
49
 observes, reference is to intermediate 
industrialising economies and industrialised economies, where the national innovation 
system of those countries supports top level R&D and education or offers, at a sub-
national level, the possibility to benefit from agglomeration economies.  
 
As empirical evidence shows, however, firms producing for the world market „may keep 
most of their technology production close to the home base‟ even in industrialised 
countries,
50
 thus supporting (or at least not contradicting) Vernon‟s initial hypothesis.51 
Reasonably, FDI inflows in developing countries will provide no evidence of the 
technology sourcing hypothesis. As Patel and Pavitt have showed, the degree of 
internationalisation of R&D is not positively correlated with high technology: „with the 
notable exception of pharmaceuticals… the proportion of firms‟ innovative activities 
performed domestically increases with the technology intensity of the industry‟.52 
 
Although research activities are mainly concentrated in home countries, transnationals 
may represent a channel for the diffusion of existing technologies and practices. Current 
analysis of the relationships between FDI, human capital and knowledge diffusion 
focuses on three main aspects. One is the upgrading of production processes by local 
subcontractors through the introduction of production standards. Related to the use of 
technical standards are voluntary processes of technological transfer and best practices 
from the foreign affiliate to local partners. In this case the technological paradigm which 
prevails in the sector determines the technologies and the knowledge that are needed for a 
firm to be involved in production networks.  
 
Another aspect of interest is provided by knowledge spillovers from transnationals to 
local economic actors. In particular, on productivity spillovers authors recognise that FDI 
creates a potential for spillovers of knowledge to local firms and the labour force.
53
 
Spillovers take the nature of „non market interdependence‟ or external economies. In this 
specific case external economies are a „peculiarity of the production function‟ as the 
output of a firm (e.g. domestic firms) „depends not only on the factors of production … 
utilised by this firm but also on the output  
… and factor utilisation of another firm or group of firms‟.54 Technological externalities 
occur, for instance, when domestic firms benefit from human capital formation by foreign 
affiliates, or when domestic firms upgrade their technologies by virtue of their proximity 
to more advanced technological realities. In both these examples the transnational aims at 
exploiting its ownership advantages, such as patents, trademarks or proprietary 
technologies in the host country. Vice versa, when it is the local knowledge that is 
attractive, foreign affiliates can benefit from the specific competencies of the local 
system, hiring skilled personnel (such as in the Irish case), or being close to centres of 
scientific or technological excellence (as in the case of Silicon Valley).  
 
The examples of spillovers refer to industrialised countries, where results are however 
mixed.
55
 For instance, one of the most prominent results of earlier studies is that 
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technologies are first transferred to high per-capita income countries, with high literacy 
rates and well developed manufacturing sectors
56
 where, however, they do not always 
increase domestic firms productivity.
57
 For developing countries, on the contrary, there is 
very little evidence of spillovers.
58
 In particular spillovers are concentrated to middle-
income developing countries while there is no support of the existence of such effects in 
countries with the lowest per-capita income.
59
  
 
This variability of results does not allow us to create a straightforward equation between 
FDI and knowledge spillovers. One reason, as we mentioned earlier, is that spillovers are 
externalities which are not encouraged by leader firms. On this point, it has been shown 
that FDI and technological licensing are higher in host countries with a strong property 
rights system.
60
 Consistently, Mansfield and Romeo
61
 conclude that for joint ventures, 
when spillovers are more likely, US transnationals transfer only older technologies.  
 
A second reason is that spillovers, as well as strategic forms of technological transfer, 
may occur if there is a basis of knowledge which allows domestic firms to understand 
new technological opportunities and to apply them. The innovative capability of 
economic actors is in their ability to integrate the knowledge of others and adapt it to 
specific needs, thus generating new, non-redundant knowledge.
62
 The transformation of 
knowledge flows into innovative solutions is related to what Cohen and Levinthal
63
 have 
defined as „absorptive capacity‟, or the ability to recognise relevant external knowledge, 
assimilate it and apply it to commercial ends. This ability may be a precondition for new 
knowledge creation and for the introduction of innovation. The ability to absorb and 
integrate knowledge builds upon the previous learning experiences in general science and 
in its technological applications. Thus we find a link between present innovation and past 
knowledge creation: an innovation that is introduced today depends on the path opened 
by the research activity started previously
64
 and by the technologies that are already in 
use.
65
 Deficiencies in communication infrastructures in developing regions and the 
scarcity of knowledge capital, which is in turn related to low educational levels of the 
labour force, are major obstacles to the activation of knowledge flows between firms. 
 
One of the major assumptions of approaches based on path dependence is that there is a 
degree of irreversibility for which previous decisions (for instance in terms of sunk or 
switching costs, knowledge basis and learning ability) may have irretrievable effects on 
the future opportunities of actors at the level of individuals, firms and territories. What 
happens at the local level with respect to production, training, education and basic 
research institutions, the financial system and market structure is paramount for the 
process of knowledge creation and technological specialisation.
66
 Thus the decision of 
headquarters to locate activities with relatively low intensities of knowledge in 
developing countries has, under particular policy conditions, a restrictive effect on the 
development possibilities of the local industry and of the locality as a whole. 
 
In those economies where the lack of local capital and knowledge leaves space for 
foreign investments, production decisions about learning and technological direction are 
the domain of transnationals. For policy makers, to rely on technological transfer from 
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foreign affiliates to local subcontractors or on the theoretical possibility of spillover 
effects implies the risk of excluding developing regions from generating autonomous 
innovative capabilities. With human capital being maybe poorly educated, lacking 
technical and managerial skills, these regions will be included in the international 
organisation of production to provide cost advantages to foreign investors (e.g. in terms 
of labour) but will be restricted to traditional, labour intensive activities characterised by 
a disqualifying fragmentation of tasks. These are sectors, as Pavitt emphasises, that are 
not autonomous generators of innovations and that do not promote R&D within the 
sector.  
 
6. Strategic failure and polarisation effects in innovation related activities 
 
The assumption we make, building on path dependency, is that learning and technological 
dynamics can activate a virtuous circle of knowledge generation and accumulation, which 
can be beneficial for local systems, both because it augments the value added produced 
and because it impacts on the ability of local communities to access a wider range of 
opportunities and shape their development objectives accordingly.
67 
Capital 
accumulation, however, is not exempted from generating conflicts and continuous 
tensions, either amongst social groups, regions or nations. Phenomena like these could be 
interpreted as the result of the eventual discrepancies that arise between the objectives 
motivating firms‟ strategies and the consequences (more or less unintended) that are 
generated at the collective level. For example, we can talk about positive unintended 
consequences in the case of spillovers or about negative (alternatively intentional or 
unintended) consequences when the development of human capital is hampered by a 
concentration of traditional, labour intensive sectors.
 
 
Within regions, transnational strategies may generate tensions due to strategic failure. 
Large transnationals, especially within those industrial sectors which heavily rely on 
R&D activities, convey great financial resources into innovation programmes. Besides, 
knowledge creation activities are central in the consolidation of oligopolistic or 
monopolistic positions and transnationals often operate in oligopolistic or monopolistic 
markets. Dunning
68
 remarks that „in some sectors (e.g. oil, tobacco, aluminium, razor 
blades, rubber tyres and reinsurance) the output is largely in the hands of a few large 
firms. In others (e.g. cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, food processing, insurance and hotels) 
the concentration ratio is not as high, but the sector is characterised by other market 
imperfections (e.g. extensive product differentiation and entry barriers).‟ Thus, in these 
sectors, control over strategic decisions with respect to innovative related activities and 
knowledge assets is retained at the heart of transnationals, which determine their broad 
corporate direction even (but not necessarily) against the will of other actors involved,
69
 
such as domestic firms, subcontractors, labour, trade unions, consumers, and 
governments. Examples of strategic failure of this kind can be found in pharmaceuticals 
where, for instance, the incentive to invest in R&D on the illnesses diffused within 
industrialised countries may be higher than the inducement to invest in research for 
finding cures to diseases that are endemic in developing countries, where purchasing 
power is very low and could not compensate the corporation for R&D expenses.  
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Strategic failure also occurs when transnationals influence the formation of human capital 
according to their specific needs. Host countries may experience the transfer of simple or 
complex technologies depending on the level of a number of elements, such as the quality 
of their human capital and skills. The nature of these technologies defines the quality of 
competences that can be learned locally, thus determining what have been named the 
„technological opportunities‟70 of local actors.  Given the cumulative nature of learning 
processes the strategic decision of which pieces of knowledge have to be used 
internationally within host countries impacts on the direction that localised knowledge 
will take in the future. The result might not be in line with the development objectives of 
a country thus incurring in strategic failure. For example, when inward investments 
promote the demand for highly qualified professionals, scientists or specialised 
technicians, host countries can be enriched, over time, by diffused scientific, managerial 
and technical knowledge which can be used as a basis for promoting local 
entrepreneurship and specialisation. Conversely, a transnational might operate as an 
„enclave‟ and siphon off the best trained individuals from the local system, thus leaving 
domestic firms with shortages of human capital and knowledge. This effect would 
negatively impact on the development of domestic entrepreneurship. Another example is 
that of countries that attract labour intensive activities and specialise in low value added 
production. Once individuals, firms, and institutions learn to perform and deal with low 
value added activities, they may be locked in and lack the conceptual categories to 
understand the evolution of knowledge in sectors characterised by higher levels of 
knowledge complexity. 
 
In parallel, tensions amongst countries and regions may occur due to polarisation effects. 
As the dynamics of development follow different levels of speed, imbalances amongst 
local systems can generate, as Myrdal emphasised,
 71
 effects of attraction and diffusion 
with respect, for example, to human and capital resources, trade, or social relations. 
Developed localities usually exert their power of attraction with respect to the resources 
of less dynamic centres, whilst diffusion occurs from the strongest locality towards 
neighbouring systems when the push for expansion is more powerful than the attraction 
coming from the strongest locality. Each change in any of the two directions (attraction or 
diffusion) generates a cumulative movement, which will be ascending or descending 
depending on its causal connection with positive or negative collective effects. Adoption 
of a long-term perspective led Myrdal to the conclusion that a system does not move 
towards equilibrium of forces but - through a process of circular and cumulative causation 
that follows one initial effect - the system tends to incrementally depart from equilibrium. 
In the long run, complementary effects - and not opposite effects - tend to accelerate 
changes within the system. As a consequence, by virtue of the process of cumulative 
causation, the concept of so-called „free markets‟72 would lead to the creation of regional 
imbalances, rather than being the mechanism to diffuse development.  
 
The international division of labour as planned by transnationals influences economic 
systems at different levels and can generate those initial effects that Myrdal identified as 
the spark of virtuous or vicious circular cumulative causation. It can be the beginning of a 
 14 
successful process of knowledge accumulation or, vice versa, it can be the foundation of a 
hardly reversible trend towards the settlement of unqualified labour and activities.  
 
With respect to knowledge formation, polarisation can be observed in phenomena of 
concentration of innovative related activities in transnationals‟ home countries and, more 
specifically, within some OECD countries, namely Japan and Germany. Given the 
cumulative nature of learning and innovation, OECD countries, especially the U.S. and 
Europe (Germany), are likely, in turn, to attract inward foreign investment that performs 
innovation related activities.
73
 
 
One reason for this can be found in agglomeration advantages, which provide forms of 
increasing return to scale in research activities. Geographical concentration of scientific 
and technological activities has been shown to promote further formation of innovative 
activities.
74
 The importance of geographical proximity is particularly relevant for the 
diffusion of tacit forms of knowledge. Tacit, unobservable and complex knowledge, 
unlike codified knowledge, can be transferred only by means of socialisation, which 
means that actors are engaged in very frequent exchanges, learning things by doing them 
together. This process is clearly easier when actors are located in the same geographical 
area.
75
 The more the technological regime of an industrial sector requires complex and 
tacit forms of knowledge, the more it will be characterised by geographical concentration 
and will determine, therefore, polarisation effects. Concentration of innovative related 
activities, besides, depends also on the localisation of scientific and technological 
competencies. The location of Universities and governmental R&D centres, for instance, 
may be relevant in those industries whose activities are linked to basic scientific research, 
such as aircraft, the production of instruments, motor vehicles and the computer 
industry.
76
 Industrial agglomerations populated by firms undertaking private R&D 
activities are attractive for sectors where knowledge complementarities require the 
coordination of research efforts amongst firms or when firms can benefit of pecuniary or 
technological externalities, such as when part of research findings spill over.
77
  
 
Countervailing forces, in parallel, can initiate a process of knowledge diffusion. 
Centrifugal effects may arise as a consequence of internationalisation strategies, which 
may pursue a variety of advantages, namely ownership, location and internalisation 
advantages.
78
 Transnational corporations, in particular, contribute to spread technologies 
and best practices across their networks of suppliers. However, the nature of the 
knowledge that is passed on to domestic firms and localities depends on the law of 
division of labour, with the risk of promoting knowledge fragmentation instead of 
specialisation.  
 
 
7. The rate and direction of technological change in developing countries 
 
The polarisation of innovative related activities carries important implications for the 
location dynamics and structure underlying the international division of labour. 
Conscious coordination of production by transnational corporations is pushed, on an 
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international scale, beyond firms‟ boundaries. Planning occurs between firms. In 
particular, transnational corporations increasingly operate as network organisations, 
directing and coordinating the activities of a cascade of subcontractors and suppliers. The 
rate and direction of innovative activities is consistently planned worldwide by a number 
of large transnational firms, which between the „80s and mid-1990s have increased the 
proportion of innovative activities performed abroad by only 2.4 percent.
79
 Whilst major 
transnationals have great financial resources and are at the forefront of R&D, developing 
countries experience problems linked to the lack of financial capital and limited internal 
market. Inward investments in low-income developing regions can be hardly oriented 
towards the establishment of innovative related activities. 
 
Innovative related activities (such as R&D) are located in some countries whilst they 
exclude others. However exclusion can be observed also when looking at ordinary 
production activities. The international division of labour discriminates countries and 
territories by allocating production activities that differ by virtue of their knowledge 
content. Firm‟s activities differ by the technology used, by the qualification of labour, and 
by the presence of educational programmes within firms. These characterisations are 
reflected in the nature of directed technology transfers, and in the nature and magnitude 
of possible spillovers. 
 
The scenario of international production is compatible with a structure that divides actors 
into „superior‟ and „subordinate‟. As Hymer80 emphasised, in a world economy 
dominated by large transnational firms, the international division of labour is divided into 
three levels, from the top which is concerned with strategic planning, to the lowest, which 
is concerned with day-to-day events. This view advances very important welfare 
implications in terms of „income, status, authority and consumption patterns‟. While 
skilled workers and superior communication systems are a prerogative of the major 
centres hosting the first levels of activities, an unskilled labour force characterises those 
activities related solely to the presence of raw materials, markets and manpower. This 
means that there are host territories where, although activities are complementary to those 
of other localities, the level of knowledge involved in production is not high enough to 
pull actors out of subordination.
81 
 
Whilst Hymer‟s uneven development is caused by factors that are external to localities, 
other contributions emphasise endogenous resources and capabilities as the main 
determinants of development. As regards individual actors, for instance, differences in the 
learning capacity imply the existence of organisations where knowledge acquisition or 
production is poorer.
82
 The same principle can be observed also within localities. Systems 
that are better able to recognise opportunities and learn from experience will gain an 
advantage with respect to less dynamic and receptive localities. 
 
However, the two causal dimensions (exogenous and endogenous) may be subject to a 
vicious circle. Localities with poor concentration of knowledge assets and, presumably, 
decision-making centres, have less strategic decision-making power than localities with 
superior resources. At the same time, this relative lack of power hinders the possibilities 
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of weak localities to be evenly included in the dynamics of knowledge diffusion and 
creation. If such a circle is activated, the impact of the technological direction planned 
worldwide by transnationals becomes a very influential element that underlies both the 
exogenous and endogenous determinants of uneven development.
 
 
 
An interesting phenomenon is the so-called telematic democracy based on the diffusion 
of the world wide web. In particular, as far as trade and production are concerned, it is 
argued that markets are „free‟ by virtue of the potential for communication that has been 
opened by the internet. Whilst this process is getting more and more structured and 
diffused in western countries, there are localities that are excluded from such a radical 
change in technologies (Figure 1). With respect to countries that are below the poverty 
line, for instance, the technological gap is getting larger, and the speed at which the gap 
increases is higher than before. The top of the „marching column‟83 has been able to 
activate a virtuous circle around the accumulation of capital and the diffusion of 
knowledge (Figure 2). On the contrary, where there is a lack of development, in terms of 
capital accumulation the speed at which elsewhere information circulates and knowledge 
is created amplifies the gap between richer and poorer localities, thus activating a vicious 
spiral that jeopardises the development of capital and knowledge in poor localities. As an 
example we plot in Figure 1 the diffusion of personal computers for selected countries. 
The two curves, continuous for the period 1996--98 and dotted for 1990, represent the 
interpolation of points that relate the number of personal computers with the degree of 
development of each country. Each of the selected countries is ranked according to the 
Human Development Index (HDI)
84 
on the horizontal axis: the more a country is 
graphically located far from the origin of the axis, the lower its HDI. 
 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 about here 
 
A comparison between the situation in 1990 and 1996--98 shows that the technological 
gap between developed and less developed countries is getting larger. Furthermore, if we 
associate considerations on technology with capital accumulation using net FDI flows as 
a proxy for a country's increase in assets (Figure 2), we observe that progressively capital 
tends to concentrate where there is the knowledge to use it effectively. Capital 
concentrates in developed countries or in newly industrialised countries (mainly in the 
Asian region).
85
 Especially in this example, the elasticity of the 1998 interpolation curve 
decreases with respect to 1987--92, which means that the HDI rank is substantially 
increasing its power in explaining the difference between countries. 
 
 
8. Policy implications and conclusions 
 
Production decisions are mainly taken by firms and, at the international level, by 
transnational corporations. The division of labour across firms and localities, in 
particular, has been accentuated by the increasing complexity of knowledge contents in 
production. Complementary activities are compatible, however, with a hierarchy of 
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functions across localities that is characterised by different levels of knowledge contents 
and by different levels of economic power. 
 
The evolution of localised knowledge is strongly influenced by the characteristics of its 
production activities. In particular, local resources and production decisions of firms exert 
a reciprocal influence on each other. On the one side local systems offer specific 
knowledge assets that may attract production activities. On the other side firms settle their 
activities also on the basis of location advantages. This mutual influence generates a 
process of cumulative and circular causation between the accumulation of resources and 
the production functions localised on a territory. Localities that are typified by labour 
intensive activities and limited knowledge assets will attract activities that require 
manpower without highly qualified competences. The resources of a local system - in 
terms of the knowledge embedded in technologies, learning and research abilities, and 
relationships - will not expand. Oppositely, host countries where specific knowledge has 
been cumulating over time will attract firms because of their knowledge resources. If the 
knowledge of foreign affiliates is then spread outside, the high knowledge content of 
production activities located within the system will further improve the amount of 
technological, human and relational resources of the territory.  
 
The problem of knowledge accumulation in developing countries cannot be solved by 
totally relying on inward investment flows from transnationals. Although FDI may, 
within particular institutional contexts, eventually stimulate the demand for qualified 
labour (e.g. managers, engineers, researchers), there are elements for arguing that within 
the international division of labour there are activities with different knowledge contents 
that are associated with specific locations.  
 
First, innovative activities are mainly retained in the country of origin, whilst if the host 
market is large enough, R&D is performed abroad to adapt product or process to different 
market conditions.  
 
Secondly, the innovativeness of the technologies transferred to host countries can be 
assessed according to two reference points. One is the technological endowment available 
in the country of origin. The other is the knowledge and technological capital of the host 
country. With respect to the first, there are no significant transfers of modern technology 
and domestic firms can at best become more productive in sectors where the technology 
used is consistent with their capabilities. When comparing foreign technologies with 
domestic ones, however, there may be a technological upgrading. This suggests that the 
gap between foreign and domestic technology may be there to stay. Technological 
transfer to transnationals‟ suppliers follows the rate and direction decided by 
headquarters, whilst eventual spillovers can take place only in sectors where domestic 
capabilities allow local firms to understand and apply the hints leaking from foreign 
affiliates.  
 
Third, thanks to agglomeration economies, innovative environments attract more 
investments, thus drawing off resources from other economic systems. This effect can 
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promote knowledge accumulation where the quality of production activities in terms of 
technologies, R&D and human capital is high. Conversely, localities with poor 
knowledge assets will not activate a virtuous cumulative process, thus enlarging the 
initial gap.  
 
Processes of cumulative causation of this sort, as Myrdal maintained, hamper 
convergence amongst regions and localities, enlarging the gap between dynamic localities 
where capital has been consolidated over time and localities where resources have 
remained poor. Where the knowledge capital attracts new resources virtuous cumulative 
processes will promote further accumulation, whilst where resources are scarce and 
knowledge does not spread outside firms, the dynamics of technological change and 
learning will be jeopardised by firms‟ strategic choices and by the power of attraction of 
more advanced areas.  
 
Though this is far from conclusive, it provides some justification for policy which 
compels developing countries to be aware of the limits of foreign capital with respect to 
local knowledge development. Transnationals possess undoubtedly great financial 
resources. However to say this  is not „the same thing as saying that they serve the general 
interest as well as their own, that they are the best way to exploit the possibilities of 
modern science‟.86 Likewise, when promoting the demand for more qualified labour, 
transnationals‟ needs impact on education policies. The risk is that countries dominated 
by foreign investments „develop a branch plant outlook, not only with reference to 
economic matters, but throughout the range of governmental and educational decision 
making‟.  
 
Where foreign investment prevails, the rate and direction of technological change and 
knowledge creation will be decided by transnationals to suite their own interests. This 
defines the nature and direction of localised knowledge and commits technological and 
human capital development to the opportunities defined by the corporate strategy. This 
scenario, as the theory of path dependence suggests, may have irreversible effects. Once a 
locality, together with its institutions and organisations, has committed to a specific 
learning and research strategy that is functional to the corporate interests of foreign 
capital, a change in direction would imply a change in the nature of the relationships that 
have been established between firms and local institutions. Moreover, this would imply 
the use of existing competences to search for new knowledge. This can enlarge the 
opportunities of domestic firms and entrepreneurship. However it requires time, capital 
and, most importantly, the ability of local actors to effectively define local development 
goals. 
 
The knowledge accumulated under the form of human, physical and relational capital can 
activate the development of further knowledge, which provides an incentive to local firms 
and institutions to become centres of strategic decision-making and shape the direction of 
development consistently with the objectives expressed at the local level. Local 
institutions may play a major role in re-launching the possibility for developing a 
knowledge based production. A first step, not surprisingly, should be towards the 
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enhancement of education programmes. Governments could encourage „brains‟ to go 
back to the country of origin, drawing on the example of Silicon Valley, which started 
industrial agglomeration around „academic stars‟. Universities can be involved in 
promoting the birth of spin-off firms, which represent the link between scientific and high 
value added academic research and entrepreneurship. Local institutions, far from being 
irrelevant, should be active in conveying the knowledge produced locally into production 
and in creating new specialisations through a continuous tension towards innovation and 
specialisation as opposed to fragmentation. For firms a policy suggestion is to work in 
partnership, exchanging ideas and developing intuitions via external competences, where 
necessary. Given the dispersed nature of knowledge, policy should focus also on the 
activation of channels for knowledge exchanges without promoting subordination of local 
firms.  
 
The policy suggestions that we have just mentioned can not be easily implemented within 
developing countries and, if they could, as Hirschman
87
 reminds us, we would not be 
talking of developing but developed countries. However, this perspective should be taken 
as an indication of a general direction, aware of the strict connections between knowledge 
formation and the international organisation of production, given the role that 
transnationals play within it. 
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Figure 1: Technological Gap between selected developed and less developed countries. 
Number of personal computers per 1000 people in 1990 and 1996--98.  
Source: authors elaboration on UNDP data (UNDP, 2000) 
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Figure 2: The Capital Accumulation Gap: net foreign direct investment flows for selected 
developed and less developed countries in 1987--92 and 1998 
Source: authors elaboration on UNDP data (UNDP, 2000) 
 
